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Abstract 
To better understand the strategic aspects of human decision-making, we conduct 
a power-to-take game in which takers are required to send messages explaining 
their actions to receivers. We vary the types and timing of information takers have 
available to them to investigate the effects of empathy and deceptive framing. We 
determine that takers who have more information tend to act and explain 
themselves more strategically. We also find that receivers prefer to interact with 
female takers even though all interactions are anonymous. These findings suggest 




Keywords: power-to-take game, altruism, empathy, stories, pro-social behavior 
 
Stories have been an integral part of human discourse since there has been 
interest in recording people’s thoughts and actions. They can be fabricated or 
truthful, purposeful or meaningless, and they can convey almost every human 
emotion. Consequently, we use them several times a day for a variety of reasons, 
and it is for these reasons that they have strategic value in decision-making. And, 
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since we control the ways in which we express our stories, we can often adapt 
them to serve our interests. 
For example, consider a job interview and the common question “Where 
do you see yourself in five years?” There are myriad ways to respond—and all are 
stories to tell—but some are more informative and influential than others. The 
applicant may employ one of several strategies to present himself in the best light 
because he wants to impress the interviewer, demonstrate interest in the firm, and 
emphasize certain aspects of his character. So perhaps the he says that he wants to 
be sitting in his interviewer’s shoes in five years. This is a vague response that 
does not satisfy any of the applicants’ goals and may even come across as an 
affront to the interviewer; this is not a good strategic option because the costs the 
story incurs outweigh its benefits. On the other hand, if the applicant lays out his 
goals along a realistic career path that is complemented by employment at the 
firm, he will have strategically used a story to his advantage. Although this 
example is trivial, its implications are quite broad. The story the applicant tells is 
costly in the sense that it has great influence on the first impression he makes with 
the interviewer, and thus it is a tool he can use to influence his wellbeing. 
Accordingly, he should treat it, and all other stories he tells, as such. Similarly, 
any story that is inappropriately valued may be used inefficiently because its 
effects are absent from the utility considerations of the person telling the story. In 
short, we must consider the strategic value of stories if we are to more completely 
understand the ways in which we interact and the optimal strategies for doing so. 
Though the economic literature on stories is relatively sparse, others have 
studied similar forms of communication at length by observing interactions in the 
power-to-take game (Bosman and van Winden, 2002). Though we explain our 
particular version of the game in detail later on, we maintain the basic structure of 
the game by partnering one active player (the “taker”) with one passive player 
(the “receiver”) and bestowing the taker with the ability to take the receiver’s 
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resources. Until recently, the receiver has been the main focus of much of the 
extant research on the power-to-take game and interpersonal interactions (Bosman 
et al., 1999, 2000, 2005; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007; Grosskopf and López-Vargas, 
2014), whereas less has been done on takers. And, while people’s behavior and 
emotions can be attributed to mechanisms such as profit maximization, empathy 
(Andreoni and Rao, 2011), and guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), 
it is likely that the means of expressing those actions and emotions—that is, the 
stories themselves that confer them—play a considerable role in their reception. 
For example, Andreoni and Rao (2011) examine the role communication plays in 
influencing altruism by investigating how it affects behavior in a dictator game. 
They find that more altruistic behavior occurs when receivers ask takers to give 
them resources, that dictators who can explain their actions however they want 
are particularly selfish, and that empathy promotes altruism. We seek to expand 
directly on these results by varying the types and timing of information takers 
have available to them at different stages in their interactions. By treating 
empathy as a time-sensitive emotion, we stand to learn more about the strategy of 
human decision-making by honing in on the factors that contribute to it. 
Grosskopf and López-Vargas (2014) explore receivers’ desires to express 
their emotions and the value of ex-post verbal communication. They conduct a 
power-to-take game in which takers can, as usual, seize the assets of receivers, but 
add the restriction that receivers cannot stop this from happening. Additionally, 
some receivers are given the option to send either free or costly messages to their 
partners through neutral third parties while others cannot send messages at all. 
The authors find that receivers are willing to pay a significant amount of their 
earnings to express their emotions, especially when takers have been particularly 
generous or stingy with them. Along with this comes the finding that receivers 
whose moods are more strongly affected by experimental events tend to value 
their expressions more and are therefore more willing to pay to express them to 
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their partners. They also find that takers behave drastically more altruistically 
when they are aware that the receivers they are playing with can send messages 
back to them, suggesting that takers who are expecting receivers to respond act 
less selfishly than those who know that takers cannot respond. This finding 
complements that of Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008), who investigate the role 
that anticipated verbal feedback has in determining altruistic behavior and find 
that expectations of correspondence lead to more altruistic behavior. 
We also examine the emotions of receivers in our experiment, both to 
reinforce the existing literature and because understanding their feelings regarding 
takers should help us understand more about how future interactions between 
people may play out. Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) investigate the effects of costly 
reciprocation and emotional ties between players in a standard power-to-take 
game. They find that players act less self-servingly and favor more equal 
distributions of resources when they know information about each other. They 
also note that expectations of behavior are reflected more strongly in changes in 
emotional state than in changes in the actual game being played; that is to say, 
people’s responses are based heavily on preconceptions—perhaps both verbal and 
nonverbal cues of some sort—and to a lesser extent on how real events compare 
with those expectations. Additionally, Bosman and van Winden (2002) find that 
receivers’ expectations of greed significantly affect their likelihood to destroy 
their own incomes so that takers cannot seize them, further supporting the notion 
that people evaluate both the monetary viewpoint from choosing a course of 
action and the resultant emotional viewpoint that an action may bring. Reuben 
and van Winden (2006) also explore the effects of time on the role of takers in 
repeated power-to-take games; they operate a game in which takers can choose to 
change their actions between rounds in response to receivers’ feedback. The 
authors find that takers’ feelings of shame, guilt, and perceptions of fairness shape 
their future interactions with receivers. It is in part for this reason that we repeat 
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our experiment over three rounds, thereby giving takers the ability to reflect on 
their own actions, explanations, and those of their partners such that they have 
more information upon which to base future decisions. 
In addition, there exists a body of research specific to the economics of 
expressing emotions in verbal, written, and other forms. Xiao and Houser (2005) 
find that negative emotions do have a quantifiable monetary value and that there 
is a significant demand for expressing emotions. Additionally, they note that 
costly, self-inflicted punishments—such as destroying one’s own resources in a 
power-to-take game—may help people express their negative emotions. They also 
study (2007) dictator games in which takers seize sub-profit-maximizing amounts 
when receivers can send them ex-post written messages, suggesting a fear of 
judgment or retribution akin to that found in Grosskopf and Lopez-Vargas’s 
recent work (2014). However, they also find that monetary threats prove more 
effective than stories when determining players’ actions in repeated games. This 
suggests that either stories lose value over time or that monetary incentives 
increase over time; we try to separate out these two effects in our experiment. 
Finally, in looking at the specific kinds of messages that people send, Ho 
(2012) finds that apologies are common early in relationships and prevalent in 
relationships between well-matched people, suggesting that apologies in our 
experiment should be used relatively sparingly since players are poorly matched. 
Thus if they are overused, it may be the case that takers are trying in vain to start 
relationships on the basis of apologies—and their apologies fall on deaf ears—
because both players are not at the stage of a relationship where apologies are 
meaningful. Additionally, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that people try 
to live up to others’ expectations and that promises encourage trust and 
cooperation between players, so perhaps the payoffs from making promises, 
which are not always monetary, can nonetheless be significant in governing 
interpersonal relationships. To this end, Vanberg (2008) studies the effects of 
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making of promises in interpersonal interactions and finds that, while people have 
an inherent preference for keeping their promises, they do not do so because 
promises guarantee specific future payoffs; instead, there is usually some other 
mechanism at work, but it tends to vary situationally. This suggests that, while 
telling a given story and behaving in a way that causes people to believe you are 
living up to it is important, there is more to people’s actions than the stories they 




 To begin to answer these questions, we employ a power-to-take game, 
which is akin to the well-known dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe 
et al., 1994; Andreoni and Miller, 2004). The payoffs in the power-to-take game 
are isomorphic to those of the dictator game, but the power-to-take game has one 
key difference, that the dictatorial “taker” party gets to allocate the assets of their 
partner, the “receiver,” and not their own (Bosman and van Winden, 2002). This 
aspect of the game introduces a difference in how the payoffs are framed; a dollar 
taken is not the same as a dollar not given (List 2007). In the standard power-to-
take game (Bosman and van Winden, 2002), there are two players and two stages. 
First, the taker, who initially earns income YT, selects some value 𝑡 ∈ [0,1], 
which is the proportion of the receiver’s income to be transferred to the taker at 
the end of the game, which we call the “take rate.” Next, the receiver, who 
initially has income YR, learns about the taker’s chosen t and selects some value 
𝑑 ∈ [0,1], which is the proportion of their income YR that will be destroyed prior 
to the taker seizing any of it. Thus final payoffs are YT + t(1-d)YR for the taker 
and (1-t)(1-d)YR for the receiver. If both parties are strictly profit maximizing, the 
taker will select t = 1 and the receiver will be indifferent between all levels of d, 
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but if for some reason t < 1, d will be 0 as any d > 0 avoidably harms the receiver. 
Thus there may be incentive for the taker to select t << 1 as they risk playing a 
profitless scenario if t is high enough to cause the receiver to select d = 0. 
Accordingly, there is reason for takers to consider the feelings of their partners, 
for if they do not, their profits and wellbeing may suffer as a result (Galeotti, 
2013). 
 However, this analysis is contingent upon the receiver’s ability to select d; 
without it—their only source of power in the standard version of the game—
nothing apart from not wanting to endure the receiver’s response prevents the 
taker from maximizing profits by selecting the highest t possible. And, in an 
anonymous scenario, there is ample reason for them to take this course of action. 
But we are interested in takers’ behavior for reasons discussed below, and 
because of this, we impose a restriction found in Grosskopf and Lopez-Vargas 
(2014), that receivers cannot prevent takers from taking their resources. This 
liberates takers to some extent since they no longer have to worry about receivers 
selecting high values of d, and instead, they can focus on decisions that serve their 
own self-interests: Payoffs are now simplified to YT + tYR for the taker and (1-
t)YR for the receiver. With takers in this mindset, we introduce another restriction, 
that takers must explain their behavior to receivers when they select a value of t. 
These explanations, the “stories” in our experiment, allow us to study the 
reasoning behind takers’ actions, which we can then use to better understand their 
decision-making processes. Ultimately, the taker’s payoff becomes YT + tYR + 
s(T, R) where s is a function describing the costs and benefits the taker’s 






II. Experimental design and mechanisms 
We deliberately set up our experiment with an emphasis on the taker role 
because, as a result of their privileges described above, takers are allowed and 
perhaps even encouraged to behave in ways that are often seen as selfish. 
Consequently, it is likely that their explanations will be costly since they may find 
it uncomfortable to think about and relate their behavior. This is especially the 
case if they have behaved in a way that receivers could construe as selfish. So, at 
risk of implicating themselves, we expect takers to treat their explanations as 
strategic stories that may harm their wellbeing if misused. However, this also 
gives rise to an alternative for takers, one that we suspect is a major mechanism 
motivating human decision making: deceptive framing.  
For our purposes, we define deceptive framing as an attempt to affect the 
reception of a story by altering the way in which it is told. Lying, for example, 
would fall under this category because it obfuscates the true emotions that are 
masked by the words in a given story; what is said is not meant, and the intention 
of this incongruity is to better the person telling the story. This strategy should 
theoretically be common for two reasons: First, we often avoid the truth as a 
means of coping or self-defense and second, we frequently act with the intent to 
deceive others. Because of these tendencies, it is feasible that takers would rather 
lie to get out of uncomfortable explanations than mentally relive and physically 
recount their behaviors truthfully, especially if they are worried about their 
actions being frowned upon. However, we hope to determine whether interactions 
are generally predicated by the intent to deceive for personal gain or whether 
doing so is a byproduct of some other force at work. In our experiment, we 
evaluate the taker’s explanation, the taker’s behavior, and the receiver’s reception 
of the takers’ actions to evaluate whether or not the taker has employed a strategy 
of deceptive framing. 
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Also, much like Andreoni and Rao, we consider empathy, as well as the 
timing of empathetic feelings, to be another important mechanism that drives 
decision-making. In their experiment, communication was allowed between the 
dictator and the receiver, and this heightened feelings of empathy—and 
altruism—as the dictator often found himself considering the scenario from the 
point of view of the receiver. In our case, this is subsumed by the function s(T, R) 
in a taker’s payoff, and we expect empathy to be most evident in comparisons 
between takers’ explanations and actions. It has been suggested in the empathy-
altruism hypothesis (Batson et al., 1988) that the desire to feel empathy, and not 
the desire to benefit oneself, is the main reason that people partake in altruistic 
behavior. This belief, in conjunction with our proposition that takers treat stories 
strategically, suggests that feelings of empathy should be evident in generous 
takers’ explanations but largely absent from those of stingy ones. Additionally, 
we provoke feelings of empathy in takers by informing them of the role receivers 
will play in the experiment. This serves both to heighten takers’ awareness of 
their partners’ conditions and to cause takers to see the costs of their own 
explanations from receivers’ points of view. Accordingly, we expect takers in 
treatments that know more about receivers to behave more altruistically in an 
effort to better themselves by not disadvantaging receivers. 
Additionally, since people make decisions that govern interactions at 
roughly the same time that they interact—i.e., their stories are generally not 
planned well in advance—this setup allows us to investigate people’s preferences 
for time-dependent utility. For instance, it may be difficult to overcome the 
impulsive desire to explain oneself in the first way that comes to mind, and this 
difficulty may lead to suboptimal decisions being made out of convenience. Also, 
people’s preferences for utility may differ depending on their behavior or the 
contents of their stories; it is not unlikely that those who behave altruistically have 
a longer-term view of the benefits their actions might have for others or that those 
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who use their stories to achieve a given strategy think about interactions in a 
fundamentally different way than others. 
Finally, we stress the social significance of an interest in the taker role 
again because of an interest in timing: People often think and act to serve their 
own interests before considering how their actions affect others. Set in the context 
of our experiment, people are more likely to be takers than receivers in everyday 
interactions. For example, if someone performs an action that merits a costly 
explanation, they become the taker in that scenario. Accordingly, all of the 
conversations that we initiate are in some way a manifestation of the taker role, 
and so long as we choose how we explain ourselves, we can strategically direct 
the course of conversation and therefore have some amount of control over our 
own payoffs. Thus studying takers in particular provides us with useful 
information that can help us understand how people think about interpersonal 
interactions.  
 
A. Taker experiment 
Before completing the experiment, all participants were given written 
instructions, all of which are available in the appendix. They then answered 
standard demographics questions and completed an effortful task, which entailed 
answering four questions about a simple data table. We paid them 
𝜋 ∈ $0.20, $0.40, $0.80   for this task to avoid endowment effects. Next, 
participants were anonymously paired in groups of two. The taker then had the 
option to take any amount 𝑡 ∈ {$0.00, $0.01,… $0.20} from the receiver. The 
receiver could not prevent this loss; they were required to accept the division of 
earnings as divided by the taker. Takers then had to explain their behavior. Over 
the course of the experiment, takers earned each possible value of   listed above 
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exactly once, but, in an effort to encourage taker recalibration between rounds, 
they did not know which round of the experiment would yield which payoff. 
Next, we elicited a willingness to pay (wtp) or willingness to accept (wta) 
from select takers by flipping a two-sided coin. If the coin landed heads, their 
explanation would have been sent to their partner by default, but they could have 
opted to pay any amount 𝑤𝑡𝑝 ∈ $0.00, $0.01,… $0.20  to try to prevent it from 
being sent. We then generated a random number 𝑟 in the range of wtp, and if 
𝑤𝑡𝑝 ≥ 𝑟, the message was not sent; otherwise, it was. In both cases, the taker 
forfeited the value r for attempting to change the course of events. Similarly, if 
the coin landed tails, the message was not sent by default, and the taker could 
have selected a 𝑤𝑡𝑎 ∈ {$0.00, $0.01,… $0.20} to try to guarantee that the 
message would be sent. A taker could not have both a positive wtp and wta; only 
one was allowed to exceed $0.00. We elicited both wtps and wtas so as not to 
restrict takers’ choices regarding how their explanations were conveyed. 
This concluded one round of the experiment, and two more rounds 
followed. Takers played against the same receivers in subsequent rounds, but they 
knew them by different aliases, so they had no reason to believe that they were 
playing against the same people over and over. Both players retained their roles in 
all three rounds. No information was divulged between rounds, but takers were 
reminded of their and their partner’s privileges each round. Takers could therefore 
earn up to 𝜋 + 𝑡 − 𝑤 per round, where 𝑤 represents wtp or wta, whichever, if 
either, the taker preferred. In total, takers could earn up to Π =      (𝜋! + 𝑡! −!!!!
𝑤!) ∈ $0.00… $2.80 . 
The messages we collected from each participant were sorted using 
MTurk. First, we asked three respondents to describe each message with a single 
adjective. Next, we formed five main categories—apology, fairness, guilt, 
honesty, and selfishness—by grouping together the most popular adjectives and 
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their derivatives (e.g. the “apology” category would encompass terms like 
“apology,” “apologetic,” “sorry,” etc.). Then, we asked five different respondents 
to sort each message into one of the five aforementioned categories or a “none of 
the above” category if they felt none were satisfactory. Messages were 
categorized by majority vote; messages with 3 apology, 1 guilt, and 1 honesty 
votes were “apology” messages, whereas messages with 2 fairness, 1 apology, 
and 2 selfishness votes went uncategorized because they were not decidedly one 
type of message or another. Nearly 95% of all messages were sorted into one of 
these categories by majority vote. 
Note that we restrict messages to one category because categorization 
becomes extraordinarily tedious otherwise. While it is clear that certain messages 
contain elements that could group them in two or more categories, we find that 
partial categorization adds nothing significant to our analysis, and given that a 
vast majority of the messages have one underlying theme, we find it suitable to 
categorize them exclusively. Additionally, in non-experimental situations, we do 
not often consider people’s behavior to be “60% selfish, 20% apologetic, and 20% 
honest”; instead, we tend to generalize: The aforementioned person would usually 
be seen as selfish or even a jerk. 
Furthermore, we require that the taker must play the game three times over 
the course of the experiment. This repetition allows us to determine whether 
takers’ behavior or rationale changes over time and, if it does, which differences 
in the scenario affect changes in their responses. And, because we slightly vary 
the rewards in each round of the experiment, this repetition causes takers to 
recalibrate their decisions. This prevents two rounds from ever being the same, 
and discourages takers from doing what they did in the last round. In sum, we 
conduct a three-round power-to-take game in which the assets start off with 
receivers and takers must explain their behavior when they select their take rates. 
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B. Receiver experiment 
Receivers and takers both completed the same set of questions before and 
after the power-to-take game part of the experiment, but receivers played against 
takers’ data at a later date. Each receiver played against three takers. In each 
round, receivers were told their partner’s partial MTurk ID, earnings for that 
round’s effortful task, the amount their partner chose to take from them (the take 
rate), and their final earnings after the round had ended. They were also shown the 
message their partner sent explaining their actions unless, as a result of the taker’s 
decisions, the explanation was not sent to the receiver. They, like the respondents 
who originally categorized takers’ messages, were asked to categorize each of 
their partner’s messages as apologetic, fair, guilty, honest, selfish, or not 
satisfactorily described by any of these adjectives. Then, receivers were asked on 
a five-point Likert Scale about the extent to which they agreed that they: thought 
their partner’s message was sincere; wanted to play with that partner again; would 
pay part of their bonus to respond to their partner; would pay part of their bonus 
to see other messages sent by their partner; trust their partner; and were content 
with how their partner behaved and explained themselves. This process was 
repeated nine times, thrice for each of the three takers they played against. 
 
C. Treatments 
We separate takers into the following twelve treatments to better 
investigate the different facets of their explanations and behavior. Participants did 
not change treatments during the experiment, and takers were assigned to only 
one treatment so that informational differences between the treatments did not 
affect the behavior of either party. The treatments are as follows:  
Informed takers know before the experiment begins that they will be asked 
to explain their behavior later on. Uninformed takers do not have this information 
to help them plan an optimal set of future choices.  
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Canpay takers are given the option to select a wtp or wta to assuage the 
potentially uncomfortable explanation they find themselves forced to give. 
Cannotpay takers do not have this ability; their messages are always sent.  
Ascending takers earn π  in  increasing  order, {$0.20, $0.40, $0.80}, where 
each element is their profit in a given round, whereas descending takers earn π  in 
decreasing order. 
And finally, msgfirst takers, a subset that only applies to canpay takers, are 
asked to write a message to their partners before we elicit a wtp or wta from them; 
conversely, payfirst takers are asked if they want to pay before writing the 
message. We make this distinction to determine whether paying before or after 
writing a message affects decisions or the messages themselves. 
Our overall experimental schematic is below. Note that the msgfirst, 
payfirst, and cannotpay nodes all have “ascending” and “descending” leaves not 
shown here. 
 









We ran our experiment on MTurk. No restrictions were placed on 
respondents except that they had to be located within the United States. We 
collected data from 587 participants over 3 rounds of the taker experiment, 
totaling 1761 observations, and from 195 individuals in the receiver experiment, 
totaling 1755 observations. The taker experiment took participants an average of 
12 minutes to complete with average earnings of $1.41, whereas the receiver 
experiment took participants roughly 8 minutes with average earnings of $0.89. 
This rate of pay is commensurate with the MTurk average for high paying 
opportunities; more information about this and the MTurk sample population in 




With the aforementioned setup in place, we propose and test the following 
hypotheses: 
First, we believe that takers will have a positive willingness to pay (or 
accept) for the transmission of their messages. In particular, we expect that takers, 
in an effort to look good, will select wtps (or wtas) to help facilitate the process of 
filtering out the ways in which receivers are able to receive their explanations. 
Along with this comes the assumption that explanations have value, which may 
be a result of guilt, regret, conflict aversion, fear of judgment or retribution, 
empathy, deceptive framing, or some other mechanism. 
Second, we believe that explanations will differ in cost, which is to say 
that, since certain emotions are more painful to convey than others, different sorts 
of explanations will accompany different behaviors. Additionally, wtps (or wtas) 
should differ by type of message if their costs are truly different. 
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Third, we believe that takers will treat the cost of explanations 
strategically in the sense that they will seek to maximize their payoffs—recall that 
taker payoffs = YT + tYR + s(T, R)—by estimating present and future values of 
explanations for both themselves and their receiver counterparts. They will shape 
their explanations to their behavior in such a way that maximizes this function. In 
particular, we suspect that the anticipated future cost of having to explain oneself 
will elicit more altruistic behavior, manifested in lower take rates, and less self-
implicating explanations. Similarly, we suspect that takers with the ability to pay 
to avoid explanations will not see them as costly future events and will instead 
behave less altruistically, relying more on their explanations than their actions to 
maximize their profit functions. In other words, they use their explanations to 
counteract some of the negative emotions associated with explaining a higher take 
rate. 
Fourth, we believe that the act of explaining oneself is costly. Accordingly, 
takers who fall in both the canpay and msgfirst treatments should have higher 
wtps than those in the payfirst treatments because the time and effort required to 
express one’s emotions are costly. Additionally, takers may recognize that there 
are aspects of their explanations that they do not want to convey. Therefore they 
may pay more to prevent them from being sent, especially if they physically have 
to type out the message before sending it. 
And fifth, we believe that takers have imperfect foresight regarding the 
impact of their explanations. In other words, though they try, they do not value 
their explanations correctly and therefore cannot plan their actions in a way that 
complements their explanations. This manifests itself in both experiments as 
takers’ ex ante beliefs—i.e., that receivers will see their explanations in a given 
light—do not often align with receivers’ ex post conceptions about them—that the 
way receivers feel about takers’ explanations was the way takers wanted them to 
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feel. This leads to receivers being unhappy with their taker counterparts and not 
wanting to maintain their relationships with them. 
 
 
III. Results from taker experiment 
As we began to analyze the data, we realized that there were few 
important changes in behavior across rounds of the experiment. This is not to say 
that individual takers behaved in similar ways between rounds—as expected, they 
still recalibrated between rounds—but rather that takers’ aggregate behavior did 
not change much over time. Accordingly, much of our analysis considers a panel 
data set where each participant in each round is treated as a unique observation. 
Though we retain round fixed effects in all of our regressions, they are not 
discussed at length since any significance in them can be attributed to takers 
refining their behavior over time or simply exploring more of their options as the 
experiment progresses. 
 
A. Summary statistics 
 
Table 1 – Taker experiment summary statistics 
Variable Mean SD Variable Mean SD 
take (¢) 44.1766 46.011 age (years) 31.8974 10.694 
takePos (%) 0.5368 0.4988 female (%) 0.4141 0.4927 
wtp (¢) 0.4704 2.4892 apology (%) 0.0313 0.1743 
wtpPos (%) 0.0592 0.2362 fairness (%) 0.3675 0.4823 
wtpIfPos (¢) 7.9403 6.7731 guilt (%) 0.0165 0.1275 
wta (¢) 0.2095 1.2111 honesty (%) 0.1937 0.3953 
wtaPos (%) 0.0575 0.2328 selfishness (%) 0.3322 0.4711 
wtaIfPos (¢) 3.6462 3.629 observations 1755   
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We first present summary statistics for our key variables of interest 
(above). A brief look at the overall distribution of takers’ explanation types 
reveals that a majority of takers flocked to certain types of explanations: Those 
concerned with fairness and selfishness are more common, honest takers are not 
far behind, and only a minority of takers apologize or admit guilt. 
Turning our attention to take rates, a full 46% of takers chose not to take 
any of their partners' earnings in the experiment, and those that did take took an 
average of only 44% of their partner’s total earnings: This proportion of non-
takers is high and this average take rate is low in comparison to similar power-to-
take games (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007; Grosskopf and Lopez-Vargas, 2014), likely 
because requiring that takers send explanations to their partners induces more 
altruistic behavior. This effect is reinforced by the actions of informed takers, 
which we will discuss shortly. 
Overall, though most takers were either content with explaining their 
actions or preferred explaining themselves to relinquishing any of their earnings, 
several were not. Nearly 6% of canpay takers were willing to pay to try to prevent 
an explanation from being sent (wtpPos), and another 6% were willing to pay to 
try to guarantee that one was sent (wtaPos). Together, nearly 12% (p < 0.01, 
n=132) of the 1,131 canpay takers exhibited a willingness to exchange earnings 
for more control over their explanations, which is itself evidence of strategic 
behavior. It is also striking that the wtpPos takers on average chose to transfer 
40% of the maximum they could, $0.20, to try to stop an explanation from being 
sent (wtpIfPos) while wtaPos takers chose to transfer only 18% of what they 
could (wtaIfPos). This difference suggests that takers felt fundamentally different 
about preventing explanations from being sent and guaranteeing that explanations 
were sent. This is reflected in both the idea that sending explanations—telling 
stories—has material value as well as in the distribution of messages within each 
subset of takers (see Table 2 below). WtpPos takers were significantly more 
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selfish than wtaPos takers in their explanations, and it is therefore unsurprising 
that they were willing to pay more to avoid costlier explanations that would 
implicate themselves in greedy behavior. 
 
Table 2 – Frequencies of explanations for takers with positive wtp or wta 
Type wtpPos wtaPos 
apology 2 4 
fairness 14 26 
guilt 5 1 
honesty 4 15 
selfishness 34 14 
other 8 5 
total 67 65 
   
We therefore find weak support for our first hypothesis and believe that the low 
rates of wtp/wta participation were likely due to profit maximizing strategies that 
valued the money saved in not paying to alter messages more heavily than the 
impact of the messages the payments could have altered. It is also worth noting 
that selecting a wtp/wta value below $0.20, the maximum we allowed, does not 
guarantee takers a certain result—recall that a random number is still drawn and 
compared to the wtp/wta value to govern the course of events—so risk averse 
takers may have preferred to grapple with an unpleasant explanation that they 
knew would transpire with complete certainty instead of a more damning 
explanation that may not have been sent with only partial certainty. The only way 
to control the fate of one’s messages with full certainty would have been to select 
a wtp/wta value of $0.20 in each round, an extremely costly choice that only two 
takers made (two others were wtp $0.20 in two of the three rounds). Predictably, 
the distribution of wtp values was different than that of wta values: a full 29 
takers were wtp $0.10 or more, while 31 were wta $0.01, another 20 were wta 
$0.05, and only 6 were wta $0.10 or more. This analysis of takers’ decisions 
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provides some amount of support for our second hypothesis, that messages differ 
in costliness, but to explore it more completely, we must first look at take rates 
and the differences between our treatments.  
 
B. Take rates and treatments 
Figure 2 – Bar chart of take rates and wtps by treatment 
 
 In Figure 2, we find support for our third hypothesis, that people treat the 
costs of explanations strategically: As anticipated, informed takers behave 
significantly more altruistically than uninformed takers, and we also find 
significant differences in wtp between the two treatments. We attribute these 
differences to the timing of information takers have access to: By virtue of having 
more information upon which to base their original decisions, informed takers are 
comparatively willing to pay much less than they otherwise would be. It also 
seems that informed takers choose a lower-variance strategy than uninformed 
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takers; by maintaining a lower take rate and wtp than uninformed takers, they 
reduce their exposure to any potential feedback from the receiver and generally 
try to minimize the receiver’s effect on their payoffs. In our regression analysis 
(following page), we find that there are indeed strategic efforts behind takers’ 
actions. Take rates play a significant role in determining the types of messages 
takers send to explain their actions, and the importance of informing select takers 
of the forthcoming explanations and granting them the ability to pay to avoid 
those explanations is further emphasized. 
We also find that canpay takers tend to behave less altruistically than their 
cannotpay counterparts, but their wtp is not that high. This suggests that canpay 
takers deliberately plan a strategy around heavy reliance on explanations—and 
payments to control the transmission of those explanations—to mitigate costs 
associated with higher take rates; in other words, they accept the fact that they 
will try to explain or pay their way out of difficult situations. This possible 
payment effect is considerable but notably smaller than the effect information has 
on takers’ decision-making processes. This may be both a case of both anchoring 
and timing: It is plausible that takers think of their interactions with receivers as a 
series of decisions. The first decision they make concerns take rate, and it is the 
most important since it governs the rest of their interactions with a given receiver. 
The second decision they make concerns explanations and, since it is conditional 
on the original take rate decision, it is less important to takers and hence has 
smaller effects on their behavior. Finally, the third decision takers make concerns 
paying to avoid explanations, which is another step removed from the original 
take rate decision and therefore inferior still. These diminishing returns to 
importance with respect to interactions lend support to our fifth hypothesis, that 




Table 3 – OLS regressions with take rate as dependent variable 
      
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
age -0.563*** -0.563*** -0.157 -0.177* -0.182* 
 (0.183) (0.184) (0.0994) (0.0962) (0.0947) 
female -12.13*** -12.13*** -2.835 -2.863 -3.270 
 (3.711) (3.714) (2.029) (2.045) (2.034) 
agreeableness -10.83*** -10.83*** -3.053*** -2.956*** -2.769*** 
 (1.816) (1.817) (1.031) (1.023) (0.964) 
informed -9.425*** -9.425*** -4.608** -8.436* -2.983 
 (3.607) (3.610) (1.939) (4.808) (10.16) 
canpay -1.842 -1.842 0.964 -10.28** -1.729 
 (4.342) (4.344) (2.340) (4.762) (12.58) 
ascending -2.286 -2.286 -2.598 -10.86** -17.88* 
 (3.529) (3.531) (1.838) (4.500) (10.07) 
msgfirst 8.098* 8.098* 2.678 6.942 30.29** 
 (4.535) (4.538) (2.351) (4.903) (12.78) 
round_2  5.470*** 3.188** 3.203** 3.235*** 
  (1.096) (1.259) (1.257) (1.249) 
round_3  7.113*** 3.048** 3.080** 3.260** 
  (1.300) (1.337) (1.337) (1.325) 
apology   41.94*** 41.43*** 54.14*** 
   (5.819) (5.813) (14.19) 
fairness   -36.22*** -36.07*** -14.84 
   (5.063) (5.040) (10.12) 
guilt   -3.732 -4.668 -9.235 
   (9.641) (9.744) (20.62) 
honesty   -40.16*** -40.04*** -26.71** 
   (5.191) (5.165) (10.58) 
selfishness   37.76*** 37.38*** 46.73*** 
   (5.054) (5.033) (10.24) 
      
constant 92.54*** 88.34*** 63.16*** 69.81*** 57.24*** 
 (15.99) (16.03) (10.20) (10.47) (13.36) 
      
round fx No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
explanations as indep vars No No Yes Yes Yes 
treatmentXtreatment intfx No No No Yes Yes 
treatmentXmessage intfx No No No No Yes 
      
Observations 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 1,626 
R-squared 0.112 0.116 0.653 0.657 0.674 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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We investigate our fourth hypothesis, that act of physically explaining 
oneself is costly, by comparing the actions of payfirst and msgfirst takers, who 
were both subsets of canpay takers, to the standard of canpay takers in general. 
Our expectation was that msgfirst takers would have higher wtps than payfirst 
takers because of the time and effort costs associated with creating an 
explanation. We actually find the contrary (see Table 3 above and Table 4 below): 
Msgfirst takers took more and were wtp less than the general canpay population, 
while payfirst takers took less and were wtp more. Table 4 also provides support 
for our second hypothesis that messages differ in costliness; the largest effects on 
wtp are associated with fairness and honesty messages, which people are more 
inclined to send because doing so does not implicate them in misbehavior.  
 
Table 4 – OLS regressions with wtp as dependent variable 
    
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
informed -0.391* -0.391* -0.422* 
 (0.223) (0.223) (0.215) 
msgfirst -0.660*** -0.660*** -0.692*** 
 (0.244) (0.244) (0.239) 
apology   -0.527 
   (0.576) 
fairness   -0.879** 
   (0.422) 
guilt   1.810 
   (1.182) 
honesty   -1.105** 
   (0.476) 
selfishness   -0.605 
   (0.478) 
round fx No Yes Yes 
explanations as indep vars No No Yes 
    
Observations 1,053 1,053 1,053 
R-squared 0.082 0.082 0.113 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In a way, msgfirst takers acted as if they were uninformed takers (high 
take rate) but were actually thinking with an aggressive form of informed logic 
(low wtp, low reliance on explanation). We see this in the types of messages they 
send: msgfirst takers, the more aggressive of the two flavors of canpay takers, 
were nearly 30% more likely to apologize, 20% more likely to admit selfishness, 
and 25% less likely to be honest than payfirst takers. In contrast, payfirst takers 
were relatively meek; they did not take very much and were relatively averse to 
their messages being sent. We can also investigate message costliness for 
informed and canpay treatments to provide further support for our second 
hypothesis. Most of Table 5 (below) is unsurprising: Informed takers’ 
explanations were more concerned with fairness and honesty than selfishness, 
whereas canpay takers’ were less fair and more selfish. The surprising result is 
that associated with apologetic takers who seemed to employ a different strategy 
altogether. 
 














Explanation type Uninformed Informed Cannotpay Canpay 
apology 0.47% 5.69% 1.44% 4.07% 
fairness 34.97% 38.46% 39.42% 35.28% 
guilt 1.40% 1.90% 1.76% 1.59% 
honesty 18.41% 20.29% 18.43% 19.89% 
selfishness 39.86% 26.87% 32.21% 33.78% 
other 4.90% 6.80% 6.73% 5.39% 
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C. Costliness of messages 
Figure 3 – Bar chart of take rates and wtps by message type 
  
To investigate this strategy further, we look at take rates and wtps by 
message type. Fairness, guilt, honesty, and selfishness takers all behave as one 
might expect, but the most striking aspect of this chart is the case of informed 
takers, who behave even more selfishly than self-proclaimed selfish takers. This is 
even more surprising given that most of the apologetic takers were in informed 
treatments, which we have thus far associated with “good” behavior. However, 
we have been overlooking a fierce strategy that only these takers employ: By 
taking extremely high amounts—51 of the 55 apologetic takers were informed, 
and only 5 of the 55 had take rates < 100%—selecting low wtps, and giving 
explanations that people generally think of as being compassionate, apologetic 
takers obtained very high payoffs with very low emotional risk because of the 
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social effects of apologies. This “misuse” of apologies contradicts much of the 
extant literature (Ho 2012) that suggests apologies are used to build and 
strengthen relationships. We postulate that information timing brings about this 
tendency. By learning ahead of time that they will need to explain themselves 
later, informed takers have the ability to select an explanation that makes them 
seem less self-centered in the eyes of receivers. If these takers believe that the 
cost-mitigating aspect of making an apology outweighs any amount of monetary 
wrongdoing that they can do to receivers, then it makes sense for them to choose 
this strategy in an effort to maximize their wellbeing.  
 
 
IV. Results from receiver experiment 
This brings us to our fifth hypothesis, that people have imperfect foresight 
about the impact of their explanations, and we investigate this in the receiver 
experiment. First we reiterate the assumption that if takers are properly valuing 
their explanations, then receivers should receive their explanations in the ways 
that takers intended for them to be received; in other words, selfishness messages 
should come across as selfish, apologies should be apologetic, etc. If this is not 
the case, it is unlikely that takers can adequately plan their actions in a way that 
complements their explanations, and they may be making misconceptions about 
how their behavior is actually received. A better understanding of their 
explanations’ reception would help them make more profitable decisions in the 
future. 
Recall that the receiver experiment was structured around several 
questions relating to receivers’ satisfaction with and perceptions about their taker 
counterparts. Instructions and regressions for the second experiment are available 
in the appendix. 
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A. Summary statistics 
Table 6 – Receiver experiment summary statistics 
Variable Mean SD 
contentedness 2.4931 1.5638 
sincerity 3.1258 1.1341 
trustworthiness 2.1684 1.5746 
seeOtherMsgs 0.7861 1.1614 
playAgain 2.1586 1.7352 
payToRespond 0.9742 1.2757 
observations 1755 
  
We present summary statistics for the six main variables in the receiver 
experiment in Table 6. All variables were measured on five-point Likert scales. 
The seventh question asked takers to characterize the explanations takers sent 
them and will be discussed shortly. 
 
B. Impact of treatments 
The considerable treatment effects found in the taker experiment are 
largely absent from the receiver experiment. The most significant finding is that 
receivers partnered with informed takers were about 12% more content with their 
behavior, 16% more interested in playing with them in subsequent rounds, and 
14% more trusting of them than they were of uninformed takers. This suggests 
that, since most informed takers behaved altruistically, they were successful in 
framing their actions in ways that were appealing to receivers. 
These, and subsequent results, are summarized in Table 7 below. Note that 
we dropped take rate from all regressions because of endogeneity concerns. 
Independent variables are listed as column headings. 
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Table 7 – OLS regressions of receiver responses to taker behavior (on a 1-5 scale) 
       
VARIABLES contentedness sincerity trustworthiness seeOtherMsgs playAgain payToRespond 
       
female 0.106 0.228*** 0.149** 0.157** 0.138** 0.190*** 
 (0.0683) (0.0608) (0.0657) (0.0635) (0.0622) (0.0678) 
agree 0.129*** 0.0271 0.132*** -0.0442 0.152*** -0.0331 
 (0.0352) (0.0314) (0.0340) (0.0328) (0.0320) (0.0350) 
informed 0.150** 0.00138 0.189*** -0.00631 0.188*** -0.0298 
 (0.0652) (0.0581) (0.0629) (0.0607) (0.0594) (0.0647) 
ascending 0.0813 0.192*** 0.0269 0.0487 0.119** 0.0243 
 (0.0634) (0.0564) (0.0611) (0.0590) (0.0576) (0.0629) 
canpay -0.0457 -0.123* -0.00577 0.127* -0.0476 0.0503 
 (0.0789) (0.0701) (0.0759) (0.0734) (0.0716) (0.0783) 
msgfirst 0.00407 0.130* -0.0813 -0.0411 0.0152 -0.0271 
 (0.0792) (0.0705) (0.0763) (0.0736) (0.0719) (0.0787) 
apology -0.996*** -0.552*** -1.001*** -0.460** -1.679*** -0.783*** 
 (0.214) (0.189) (0.204) (0.198) (0.193) (0.212) 
fairness 1.017*** 0.561*** 1.284*** 0.0652 1.358*** 0.172 
 (0.142) (0.126) (0.136) (0.132) (0.129) (0.141) 
guilt -0.267 -0.168 -0.0654 0.513** -0.0308 0.333 
 (0.257) (0.229) (0.248) (0.243) (0.234) (0.256) 
honesty 0.930*** 0.519*** 1.191*** 0.171 1.243*** 0.176 
 (0.150) (0.133) (0.143) (0.139) (0.136) (0.149) 
selfishness -1.091*** 0.0381 -0.942*** -0.432*** -1.441*** -0.607*** 
 (0.143) (0.127) (0.137) (0.133) (0.130) (0.142) 
msglength 0.00112* 0.00161*** 0.00144** 0.00110** 0.00103* 0.000794 
 (0.000583) (0.000519) (0.000561) (0.000544) (0.000530) (0.000580) 
round_2 -0.122 -0.122* -0.112 -0.0786 -0.146** -0.107 
 (0.0767) (0.0685) (0.0741) (0.0715) (0.0699) (0.0763) 
round_3 -0.104 -0.153** -0.0607 -0.0423 -0.138** -0.0729 
 (0.0774) (0.0688) (0.0744) (0.0720) (0.0702) (0.0768) 
Constant 2.064*** 1.590*** 1.799*** 0.794** 2.001*** 1.096*** 
 (0.336) (0.299) (0.323) (0.313) (0.306) (0.334) 
       
Observations 1,443 1,454 1,448 1,448 1,448 1,448 
R-squared 0.440 0.142 0.489 0.127 0.625 0.153 




C. Impact of explanations 
Much like in the taker experiment, the different kinds of messages takers 
used to explain themselves had a large impact on their behavior and consequently 
their reception by receivers. Receivers who received fairness and honesty 
messages were very much pleased with their partners’ behavior, whereas those 
who received apology and selfishness messages were not. Reception of apologetic 
messages was particularly poor and even surpassed selfishness messages in 
eliciting negative responses from receivers. It is also worth noting that receivers 
were less interested in seeing the other messages takers sent and paying to 
respond to them when they had been wronged by behavior associated with a 
greedier message. This effect is absent for fairness, guilt, and honesty messages 
and suggests that receivers who had been wronged were mostly concerned with 
how they, themselves, had been treated and not how other people in general fared. 
Thus the taker strategy of sending greedy messages—which are associated with 
greedy actions and cause negative emotions on the receivers’ end—leads to a lack 
of pro-social behavior. Lastly, we found that recipients of longer messages were 
more pleased with their partners as well. 
 
D. Impact of explanation classifications 
 
Table 8 – Comparison of message categorization between experiments 
Taker classification Receiver classification 
 apology percent fairness percent guilt percent honesty percent selfishness percent 
apology 11 20.0% 0 0.0% 4 7.3% 17 30.9% 22 40.0% 
fairness 8 1.2% 427 66.4% 22 3.4% 150 23.3% 21 3.3% 
guilt 7 24.1% 4 13.8% 7 24.1% 8 27.6% 3 10.3% 
honesty 6 1.8% 171 50.3% 20 5.9% 97 28.5% 14 4.1% 
selfishness 17 2.9% 17 2.9% 17 2.9% 181 31.2% 329 56.6% 
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We find that many messages were categorized differently in the second 
experiment than in the first (see Table 8, above). For example, only 20% of 
messages categorized as apologies in the first experiment were received as 
apologies in the second; twice as many were considered selfish, a finding that 
summarizes how receivers felt about apologetic takers’ behavior. Fairness 
messages held up well, and many honesty messages were received as fair, likely 
because the categories are closely related. Despite the small sample size, guilt 
messages were received in mixed ways, perhaps suggesting either that people do a 
relatively poor job of signaling guilt when they mean it or a relatively good job of 
hiding it when they do not. Lastly, a large number of selfishness messages were 
seen as honest. Overall, this finding supports our fifth hypothesis since people do 
not fully understand how they are actually presenting themselves to others. Thus 
they often employ a suboptimal strategy predicated on misunderstanding or use 
deceptive framing to avoid saying what they actually mean for strategic purposes.  
It is also worth noting that there were no significant gender effects present 
in receivers’ classification of messages. While men were more likely to send 
greedy messages, neither men nor women were more likely to receive them, or 
any other kinds of message, differently. 
 
E. Impact of gender 
Perhaps the most interesting and socially significant finding of the second 
experiment was that, even after controlling for all relevant variables relating to 
both takers and receivers, all subsets of receivers significantly preferred to interact 
with female takers rather than male ones (refer to Table 7). The magnitude of the 
effect was comparable to that of being partnered with an informed taker, but it 
was prevalent in more of the questions asked of receivers; it was significant in the 
contentedness question at the 12% significance level, the only question above 
10%. This suggests that women inherently express themselves differently than 
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men do in ways that we have not accounted for. And, short of conducting detailed 
text analysis on the explanations takers sent, we conclude that the reasoning for 
this effect is beyond the initial scope of our experiment. Accordingly, it is 
dangerous to over-interpret the result, but we encourage research efforts directed 




In the introduction, we set out to untangle the strategy behind human 
decision-making in an effort to better understand the economic value of costly 
explanations. We claimed that takers would treat their explanations strategically 
and found support for this in the fact that their behavior changed drastically 
between treatments. In particular, we note that information, and particularly the 
timing of that information, plays a substantial role in shaping takers’ decisions. 
From a theoretical perspective, both informed and canpay takers obtain 
knowledge about the future that they can use to make better decisions in the 
present, yet the information comes framed in different ways. Takers in informed 
treatments learn ahead of time about a certain future explanation, which may be 
seen as a cost by some, whereas canpay takers are informed ahead of time about 
an entirely optional future cost. As such, we are offering the different subsets of 
takers information about their own "wellbeing futures" and letting them set the 
price. Additionally, there may also exist a physiological timing difference 
between the two: It may be the case that humans make decisions that trigger our 
informed brains (which answer the question “How should I act given this future 
scenario?”) before triggering our canpay brains (which answer “How do I 
reconcile my behavior with this explanation?”), but again, investigating this 
question is beyond the scope of our experiment. 
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Nonetheless, when told ahead of time about future explanations, informed 
takers behaved more altruistically and explained themselves in ways that better 
met receivers’ expectations. Contrariwise, when told beforehand that they would 
be able to pay to avoid future explanations, canpay takers behaved less 
altruistically and put more of their actions’ weight on their explanations. In other 
words, they acted selfishly, tried to explain their way out of upsetting their 
partners, and were willing to pay more to try to do so. This supports another of 
our hypotheses, that takers have a positive willingness to pay (or accept) for 
control over their explanations’ transmission. We also explain a time-dependent 
mechanism for why only an eighth of takers were willing to exchange earnings 
for a control over the receipt of their explanations: As takers make repeated 
decisions in a given interactions, subsequent decisions become increasingly less 
valuable to them. Thus, by the time they are considering whether to select a 
positive wtp/wta value—no less than their third decision along the way—they 
have already made more important decisions, so this one does not matter as much 
in comparison. 
We also argued that explanations differ in cost and find support for this in 
the fact that different treatments were very strongly associated with sending 
different types of explanations and accordingly, with vastly different strategic 
approaches to the game. Willingnesses to pay were also highly disparate between 
treatments. Associated with this argument was the claim that the act of explaining 
oneself is in itself costly, for which we find support for the opposite; takers who 
sent their messages first were less altruistic and less willing to pay than those who 
paid before sending messages, which supports the ideas that people are generally 
interested in expressing themselves and the costs associated with doing so are 
small. 
 Finally, we argued that takers have imperfect foresight about the impact of 
their explanations, and we find support for this as well. Apologies, our best 
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example of deceptive framing, were almost negligibly costly for takers (even less 
so than self-implicating selfish explanations), but the fact that receivers did not 
receive them well suggests that they were misused as a result of takers 
misunderstanding their strategic value. Fairness and honesty messages, on the 





As such, these results paint an interesting picture of the taker role in 
society and the strategy of explanations in general. While it is clear that we 
attempt to strategize when it comes to explaining ourselves, it is equally clear that 
we do not do so very well. It is likely that we overvalue our own payoffs—i.e., 
rely too heavily on mechanisms such as deceptive framing—and do not consider 
the effects that our explanations have on others—show empathy—nearly enough. 
And, while it is not always our intent to deceive others, it often happens that we 
do so as a result of failing to understand how our actions affect them. This makes 
our second experiment all the more relevant. Each of the questions posed in the 
receiver experiment dealt with a social practice: The contentedness, sincerity, 
trustworthiness, and playAgain questions had to do with different aspects building 
and maintaining relationships; the seeOtherMsgs question had to do with social 
“snooping”; and the payToRespond question had to do with retribution. These are 
all pertinent question in the study of interpersonal interactions, and the fact that 
female takers fared better than male ones in all of them suggests that women are 
inherently better at explaining themselves in ways that appeal to receivers, which 
is significant. This finding would imply that, women should more readily make 
costly explanations than men. And, though this is perhaps an overstatement of the 
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findings, it is clear that these results carry weight in studying matters of politics, 
finance, and other fields that deal with interpersonal interactions. 
But in some ways, the most relevant treatment in our experiment is the 
uninformed, canpay one since it is the “default” state of most people in everyday 
life: They are not actively thinking about their futures but do have some amount 
of agency over the course of their interactions. Per our findings, these people are 
prone to low levels of altruistic behavior, self-serving explanations, and, in 
general, little concern for other people. This seems like a fairly bleak perspective, 
but, by informing people about their futures, it may be possible to shift them into 
the informed, canpay condition where they are more likely to engage in altruistic 
and pro-social behavior and send well-received explanations. Many would argue 
that this is more desirable state of existence, one in which we recognize the value 
of our explanations and can more easily behave optimally in interpersonal 
interactions. Thus there is need for more research on the topic of the economics of 
stories. There is a wealth of possible applications for modeling behavior based on 
communication and inducing changes in behavior in a predictable fashion. The 
fields of politics and finance immediately come to mind: Imagine how would the 
world be different if we could more easily encourage altruistic behavior in 
politicians, persuade world leaders to behave more pro-socially, or even simply 
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A. Taker experiment instructions 
Informed, canpay, ascending, msgfirst: http://goo.gl/3lZ3ay 
Informed, canpay, ascending, payfirst: http://goo.gl/Dk5KAT 
Informed, canpay, descending, msgfirst: http://goo.gl/l2EMm7 
Informed, canpay, descending, payfirst: http://goo.gl/txT9YN 
 
Uninformed, canpay, ascending, msgfirst: http://goo.gl/OjQ2qH 
Uninformed, canpay, ascending, payfirst: http://goo.gl/GJE2u5 
Uninformed, canpay, descending, msgfirst: http://goo.gl/UNfw2C 
Uninformed, canpay, ascending, payfirst: http://goo.gl/JWGGBP 
 
Informed, cannotpay, ascending: http://goo.gl/WFMYty 
Informed, cannotpay, descending: http://goo.gl/VdKq6c 
 
Uninformed, cannotpay, ascending: http://goo.gl/cXzsrC 
Uninformed, cannotpay, descending: http://goo.gl/6RalWR 
 
B. Receiver experiment instructions 
All receiver treatments: http://goo.gl/tnWBwr 
